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Abstract. This article presents a novel perspective along with a scalable methodology to
design a fault detection and isolation (FDI) filter for high dimensional nonlinear systems.
Previous approaches on FDI problems are either confined to linear systems or they are only
applicable to low dimensional dynamics with specific structures. In contrast, shifting attention
from the system dynamics to the disturbance inputs, we propose a relaxed design perspective
to train a linear residual generator given some statistical information about the disturbance
patterns. That is, we propose an optimization-based approach to robustify the filter with
respect to finitely many signatures of the nonlinearity. We then invoke recent results in ran-
domized optimization to provide theoretical guarantees for the performance of the proposed
filer. Finally, motivated by a cyber-physical attack emanating from the vulnerabilities intro-
duced by the interaction between IT infrastructure and power system, we deploy the developed
theoretical results to detect such an intrusion before the functionality of the power system is
disrupted.
1. Introduction
The task of FDI in control systems involves generating a diagnostic signal sensitive to the
occurrence of specific faults. This task is typically accomplished by designing a filter with all
available information as inputs (e.g., control signals and given measurements) and a scalar output
that implements a non-zero mapping from the fault to the diagnostic signal, which is known as
the residual, while decoupling unknown disturbances. The concept of residual plays a central
role for the FDI problem which has been extensively studied in the last two decades.
In the context of linear systems, Beard and Jones [Bea71, Jon73] pioneered an observer-based
approach whose intrinsic limitation was later improved by Massoumnia et al. [MVW89]. Follow-
ing the same principles but from a game theoretic perspective, Speyer and coauthors thoroughly
investigated the approach in the presence of noisy measurements [CS98, DS99]. Nyberg and Frisk
extended the class of systems to linear differential-algebraic equation (DAE) apparently subsum-
ing all the previous linear classes [NF06], which recently also studied in the context of stochastic
linear systems [EFK13]. This extension greatly enhanced the applicability of FDI methods since
the DAE models appear in a wide range of applications, including electrical systems, robotic
manipulators, and mechanical systems.
For nonlinear systems, a natural approach is to linearize the model at an operating point,
treat the nonlinear higher order terms as disturbances, and decouple their contributions from the
residual by employing robust techniques [SF91, HP96]. This strategy only works well if either
the system remains close to the chosen operating point, or the exact decoupling is possible. The
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former approach is often limited, since in the presence of unknown inputs the system may have
a wide dynamic operating range, which in case linearization leads to a large mismatch between
linear model and nonlinear behavior. The latter approach was explored in detail by De Persis and
Isidori, who in [PI01] proposed a differential geometric approach to extend the unobservibility
subspaces of [Mas86, Section IV], and by Chen and Patton, who in [CP82, Section 9.2] dealt with
a particular class of bilinear systems. These methods are, however, practically limited by the
need to verify the required conditions on the system dynamics and transfer them into a standard
form, which essentially involve solving partial differential equations, restricting the application
of the method to relatively low dimensional systems.
Motivated by this shortcoming, in this article we develop a novel approach to FDI which
strikes a balance between analytical and computational tractability, and is applicable to high
dimensional nonlinear dynamics. For this purpose, we propose a design perspective that basically
shifts the emphasis from the system dynamics to the family of disturbances that the system may
encounter. We assume that some statistical information of the disturbance patterns is available.
Following [NF06] we restrict the FDI filters to a class of linear operators that fully decouple the
contribution of the linear part of the dynamics. Thanks to the linearity of the resulting filter, we
then trace the contribution of the nonlinear term to the residual, and propose an optimization-
based methodology to robustify the filter to the nonlinearity signatures of the dynamics by
exploiting the statistical properties of the disturbance signals. The optimization formulation is
effectively convex and hence tractable for high dimensional dynamics. Some preliminary results
in this direction were reported in [MVAL12], while an application of our approach in the presence
of measurement noise was successfully tested for wind turbines in [SMEKL13].
The performance of the proposed methodology is illustrated in an application to an emerging
problem of cyber security in power networks. In modern power systems, the cyber-physical in-
teraction of IT infrastructure (SCADA systems) with physical power systems renders the system
vulnerable not only to operational errors but also to malicious external intrusions. As an exam-
ple of this type of cyber-physical interaction we consider here the Automatic Generation Control
(AGC) system, which is one of the few control loops in power networks that are closed over the
SCADA system without human operator intervention. In earlier work [MVM+10, MVM+11] we
have shown that, having gained access to the AGC signal, an attacker can provoke frequency
deviations and power oscillations by applying sophisticated attack signals. The resulting dis-
ruption can be serious enough to trigger generator out-of-step protection relays, leading to load
shedding and generator tripping. Our earlier work, however, also indicated that an early de-
tection of the intrusion may allow one to disconnect the AGC and limit the damage by relying
solely on the so-called primary frequency controllers. In this work we show how to mitigate
this cyber-physical security concern by using the proposed FDI scheme to develop a protection
layer which quickly detects the abnormal signals generated by the attacker. This approach to
enhancing the cyber-security of power transmission systems led to an EU patent sponsored by
ETH Zurich [MEVAL].
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 a formal description of the FDI problem as
well as the outline of the proposed methodology is presented. A general class of nonlinear models
is described in Section 3. Then, reviewing residual generation for the linear models, we develop
an optimization-based framework for nonlinear systems in Section 4. Theoretical guarantees are
also provided in the context of randomized algorithms. We apply the developed methodology
to the AGC case study in Section 5, and finally conclude with some remarks and directions for
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Figure 1. General configuration of the FDI filter
future work in Section 6. For better readability, the technical proofs of Sections 4.2 and 4.3 are
moved to the appendices.
Notation. The symbols N and R+ denote the set of natural and nonnegative real numbers,
respectively. Let A ∈ Rn×m be an n×m matrix with real values, Aᵀ ∈ Rm×n be its transpose,
and ‖A‖2 := σ(A) where σ is the maximum singular value of the matrix. Given a vector
v := [v1, · · · , vn]ᵀ, the infinite norm is defined as ‖v‖∞ := maxi≤n |vi|. Let G be a linear matrix
transfer function. Then ‖G‖H∞ := supω∈R σ
(
G(jω)
)
, where σ is the maximum singular value
of the matrix G(jω). The function space Wn denotes the set of piece-wise continuous (p.w.c)
functions taking values in Rn, andWnT is the restriction ofWn to the time interval [0, T ], which is
endowed with the L2-inner product, i.e., 〈e1, e2〉 :=
∫ T
0
eᵀ1(t)e2(t)dt with the associated L2-norm
‖e‖L2 :=
√〈e, e〉. The linear operator p : Wn → Wn is the distributional derivative operator.
In particular, if e : R+ → Rn is a smooth mapping then p[e(t)] := ddte(t). Given a probability
space (Ω,F ,P), we denote the n-Cartesian product space by Ωn := ⊗ni=1 Ω and the respective
product measure by Pn.
2. Problem Statement and Outline of the Proposed Approach
In this section, we provide the formal description of the FDI problem as well as our new design
perspective. We will also outline our methodology to tackle the proposed perspective.
2.1. Formal Description. The objective of the FDI design is to use all information to generate
a diagnostic signal to alert the operators to the occurrence of a specific fault. Consider a general
dynamical system as in Figure 1 with its inputs categorized into (i) unknown inputs d, (ii) fault
signal f , and (iii) known inputs u. The unknown input d represents unknown disturbances that
the dynamical system encounters during normal operation. The known input u contains all
known signals injected to the system which together with the measurements y are available for
FDI tasks. Finally, the input f is a fault (or an intrusion) which cannot be directly measured
and represents the signal to be detected.
The FDI task is to design a filter whose input are the known signals (u and y) and whose
output (known as the residual and denoted by r) differentiates whether the measurements are a
consequence of some normal disturbance input d, or due to the fault signal f . Formally speaking,
the residual can be viewed as a function r(d, f), and the FDI design is ideally translated as the
mapping requirements
d 7→ r(d, 0) ≡ 0,(1a)
f 7→ r(d, f) 6= 0, ∀d(1b)
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where condition (1a) ensures that the residual of the filter, r, is not excited when the system is
perturbed by normal disturbances d, while condition (1b) guarantees the filter sensitivity to the
fault f in the presence of any disturbance d.
The state of the art in FDI concentrates on the system dynamics, and imposes restrictions
to provide theoretical guarantees for the required mapping conditions (1). For example, the
authors in [NF06] restrict the system to linear dynamics, whereas [HKEY99, PI01] treat nonlinear
systems but impose necessary conditions in terms of a certain distribution connected to their
dynamics. In an attempt to relax the perfect decoupling condition, one may consider the worst
case scenario of the mapping (1) in a robust formulation as
RP :

min
γ,F
γ
s.t.
∥∥r(d, 0)∥∥ ≤ γ, ∀d ∈ D
f 7→ r(d, f) 6= 0, ∀d ∈ D,
(2)
where D is set of normal disturbances, γ is the alarm threshold of the designed filter, and the
minimization is running over a given class of FDI filters denoted by F. Note that the residual r is
influenced by the choice of the filter in F, but we omit this dependence for notational simplicity.
In view of formulation (2), an alarm is only raised whenever the residual exceeds γ, i.e., the
filter avoids any false alarm. This, however, comes at the cost of missed detections of the faults
whose residual is not bigger than the threshold γ. In the literature, the robust perspective RP
has also been studied in order for a trade-off between disturbance rejection and fault sensitivity
for a certain class of dynamics, e.g., see [CP82, Section 9.2] for bilinear dynamics and [FF12] for
multivariate polynomial systems.
2.2. New Design Perspective. Here we shift our attention from the system dynamics to the
class of unknown inputs D. We assume that the disturbance signal d comes from a prescribed
probability space and relax the robust formulation RP by introducing probabilistic constraints
instead. In this view, the performance of the FDI filter is characterized in a probabilistic fashion.
Assume that the signal d is modeled as a random variable on the prescribed probability space
(Ω,F ,P), which takes values in a metric space endowed with the corresponding Borel sigma-
algebra. Assume further that the class of FDI filters ensures the measurability of the mapping
d 7→ r where r also belongs to a metric space. In light of this probabilistic framework, one may
quantify the filter performance from different perspectives; in the following we propose two of
them:
AP :

min
γ,F
γ
s.t. E
[
J
(‖r(d, 0)‖)] ≤ γ
f 7→ r(d, f) 6= 0, ∀d ∈ D,
CP :

min
γ,F
γ
s.t. P
(‖r(d, 0)‖ ≤ γ) ≥ 1− ε
f 7→ r(d, f) 6= 0, ∀d ∈ D,
(3)
where E[ · ] in AP is meant with respect to the probability measure P, and ‖ · ‖ is the corre-
sponding norm in the r space. The function J : R+ → R+ in AP and ε ∈ (0, 1) in CP are design
parameters. To control the filter residual generated by d, the payoff function J is required to
be in class K∞, i.e., J is strictly increasing and J(0) = 0 [Kha92, Definition 4.2, p. 144]. The
decision variables in the above optimization programs are F, a class of FDI filters which is cho-
sen a priori, and γ which is the filter threshold; we shall explain these design parameters more
explicitly in subsequent sections.
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Two formulations provide different probabilistic interpretations of fault detection. The pro-
gram AP stands for “Average Performance” and takes all possible disturbances into account,
but in accordance with their occurrence probability in an averaging sense. The program CP
stands for “Chance Performance” and ignores an ε-fraction of the disturbance patterns and only
aims to optimize the performance over the rest of the disturbance space. Note that in the CP
perspective, the parameter ε is an additional design parameter to be chosen a priori.
Let us highlight that the proposed perspectives rely on the probability distribution P, which
requires prior information about possible disturbance patterns. That is, unlike the existing liter-
ature, the proposed design prioritizes between disturbance patterns in terms of their occurrence
likelihood. From a practical point of view this requirement may be natural; in Section 5 we will
describe an application of this nature.
2.3. Outline of the Proposed Methodology. We employ randomized algorithms to tackle
the formulations in (3). We generate n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) scenarios
(di)
n
i=1 from the probability space (Ω,F ,P), and consider the following optimization problems
as random counterparts of those in (3):
A˜P :

min
γ,F
γ
s.t. 1n
∑n
i=1 J
(‖r(di, 0)‖) ≤ γ
f 7→ r(d, f) 6= 0, ∀d ∈ D
C˜P :

min
γ,F
γ
s.t. max
i≤n
‖r(di, 0)‖ ≤ γ
f 7→ r(d, f) 6= 0, ∀d ∈ D,
(4)
Notice that the optimization problems A˜P and C˜P are naturally stochastic as they depend on
the generated scenarios (di)
n
i=1, which is indeed a random variable defined on n-fold product
probability space (Ωn,Fn,Pn). Therefore, their solutions are also random variables. In this
work, we first restrict the FDI filters to a class of linear operators in which the random programs
(4) are effectively convex, and hence tractable. In this step, the FDI filter is essentially ro-
bustified to n signatures of the dynamic nonlinearity. Subsequently, invoking existing results on
randomized optimization, in particular [Han12, MSL15], we will provide probabilistic guarantees
on the relation of programs (3) and their probabilistic counterparts in (4), whose precision is
characterized in terms of the number of scenarios n.
We should highlight that the true empirical approximation of the chance constraint in CP is
indeed 1n
∑n
i=1 1
{
||r(di,0)||≤γ
} ≥ 1 − ε, where 1 is the indicator function. This approximation,
as opposed to the one proposed in (4), leads to a non-convex optimization program which is, in
general, computationally intractable. In addition, note that the design parameter ε of CP in (3)
does not explicitly appear in the random counterpart C˜P in (4). However, as we will clarify in
4.3, the parameter ε contributes to the probabilistic guarantees of the design.
3. Model Description and Basic Definitions
In this section we introduce a class of nonlinear models along with some basic definitions,
which will be considered as the system dynamics in Figure 1 throughout the article. Consider
the nonlinear differential-algebraic equation (DAE) model
E(x) +H(p)x+ L(p)z + F (p)f = 0,(5)
where the signals x, z, f are assumed to be piece-wise continuous (p.w.c.) functions from R+ into
Rnx ,Rnz ,Rnf , respectively; we denote the spaces of such signals byWnx ,Wnz ,Wnf , respectively.
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Let nr be the number of rows in (5), and E : Rnx → Rnr be a Lipschitz continuous mapping.
The operator p is the distributional derivative operator [Ada75, Section I], and H,L, F are
polynomial matrices in the operator p with nr rows and nx, nz, nf columns, respectively. In the
setup of Figure 1, the signal x represents all unknowns signals, e.g., internal states of the system
dynamics and unknown disturbances d. The signal z contains all known signals, i.e., it is an
augmented signal including control input u and available measurements y. The signal f stands
for faults or intrusion which is the target of detection. We refer to [Shc07] and the references
therein for general theory of nonlinear DAE systems and the regularity of their solutions.
One may extend the space of functions x, z, f to Sobolev spaces, but this is outside the scope
of our study. On the other hand, if these spaces are restricted to the (resp. right) smooth
functions, then the operator p can be understood as the classical (resp. right) differentiation
operator. Throughout this article we will focus on continuous-time models, but one can obtain
similar results for discrete-time models by changing the operator p to the time-shift operator. We
will think of the matrices H(p), L(p) and F (p) above either as linear operators on the function
spaces (in which case p will be interpreted as a generalized derivative operator as explained
above) or as algebraic objects (in which case p will be interpreted as simply a complex variable).
The reader is asked to excuse this slight abuse of the notation, but the interpretation should be
clear from the context.
Let us first show the generality of the DAE framework of (5) by the following example.
Consider the classical nonlinear ordinary differential equation{
GX˙(t) = EX
(
X(t), d(t)
)
+AX(t) +Buu(t) +Bdd(t) +Bff(t)
Y (t) = EY
(
X(t), d(t)
)
+ CX(t) +Duu(t) +Ddd(t) +Dff(t)
(6)
where u( · ) is the input signal, d( · ) the unknown disturbance, Y ( · ) the measured output, X( · )
the internal variables, and f( · ) a faults (or an attack) signal to be detected. Parameters G,
A, Bu, Bd, Bf , Du, Dd, and Df are constant matrices and functions EX , EY are Lipschitz
continuous mappings with appropriate dimensions. One can easily fit the model (6) into the
DAE framework of (5) by defining
x :=
[
X
d
]
, z :=
[
Y
u
]
,
E(x) :=
[
EX(x)
EY (x)
]
, H(p) :=
[−pG+A Bd
C Dd
]
, L(p) :=
[
0 Bu
−I Du
]
, F (p) :=
[
Bf
Df
]
.
Following [NF06], with a slight extension to a nonlinear dynamics, let us formally characterize
all possible observations of the model (5) in the absence of the fault signal f :
(7) M := {z ∈ Wnz ∣∣ ∃x ∈ Wnx : E(x) +H(p)x+ L(p)z = 0};
This set is known as the behavior of the system [PW98].
Definition 3.1 (Residual Generator). A proper linear time invariant filter r := R(p)z is a
residual generator for (5) if for all z ∈M, it holds that lim
t→∞ r(t) = 0.
Note that by Definition 3.1 the class of residual generators in this study is restricted to a class
of linear transfer functions where R(p) is a matrix of proper rational functions of p.
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Definition 3.2 (Fault Sensitivity). The residual generator introduced in Definition 3.1 is sen-
sitive to fault fi if the transfer function from fi to r is nonzero, where fi is the i
th elements of
the signal f .
One can inspect that Definition 3.1 and Definition 3.2 essentially encode the basic mapping
requirements (1a) and (1b), respectively.
4. Fault Detection and Isolation Filters
The main objective of this section is to establish a scalable framework geared towards the
design perspectives AP and CP as explained in Section 2. To this end, we first review a polyno-
mial characterization of the residual generators and its linear program formulation counterpart
for linear systems (i.e., the case where E(x) ≡ 0). We then extend the approach to the nonlinear
model (5) to account for the contribution of E( · ) to the residual, and subsequently provide
probabilistic performance guarantees for the resulting filter.
4.1. Residual Generators for Linear Systems. In this subsection we assume E(x) ≡ 0, i.e.,
we restrict our attention to the class of linear DAEs. One can observe that the behavior set M
can alternatively be defined as
M = {z ∈ Wnz ∣∣ NH(p)L(p)z = 0},
where the collection of the rows of NH(p) forms an irreducible polynomial basis for the left
null-space of the matrix H(p) [PW98, Section 2.5.2]. This representation allows one to describe
the residual generators in terms of polynomial matrix equations. That is, by picking a linear
combination of the rows of NH(p) and considering an arbitrary polynomial a(p) of sufficiently
high order with roots with negative real parts, we arrive at a residual generator in the sense of
Definition 3.1 with transfer operator
(8) R(p) = a−1(p)γ(p)NH(p)L(p) := a−1(p)N(p)L(p),
where γ(p) is a polynomial row vector representing a linear combination of the rows of NH(p).
Note that the role of γ(p) is implicitly taken into consideration by N(p) := γ(p)NH(p). The
above filter can easily be realized by an explicit state-space description with input z and output
r. Multiplying the left hand-side of (5) by a−1(p)N(p) leads to
r = −a−1(p)N(p)F (p)f.
Thus, a sensitive residual generator, in the sense of Definition 3.1 and Definition 3.2, is charac-
terized by the polynomial matrix equations
N(p)H(p) = 0,(9a)
N(p)F (p) 6= 0,(9b)
where (9a) implements condition (1a) above (cf. Definition 3.1) while (9b) implements condition
(1b) (cf. Definition 3.2). Both row polynomial vector N(p) and denominator polynomial a(p)
can be viewed as design parameters. Throughout this study we, however, fix a(p) and aim to find
an optimal N(p) with respect to a certain objective criterion related to the filter performance.
In case there are more than one faults (nf > 1), it might be of interest to isolate the impact
of one fault in the residual from the others. The following remark implies that the isolation
problem is effectively a detection problem.
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Remark 4.1 (Fault Isolation). Consider model (5) and suppose nf > 1. In order to detect only
one of the fault signals, say f1, and isolate it from the other faults, fi, i ∈ {2, · · · , nf}, one may
consider the detection problem for the same model but in new representation
E(x) + [H(p) F˜ (p)]
[
x
f˜
]
+ L(p)z + F1(p)f = 0,
where F1(p) is the first column of F (p), and F˜ (p) := [F2(p), · · · , Fnf (p)], and f˜ := [f2, · · · , fnf ].
In light of Remark 4.1, one can build a bank of filters where each filter aims to detect a
particular fault while isolating the impact of the others; see [FKA09, Theorem 2] for more
details on fault isolation. Next, we show how to transform the matrix polynomial equations (9)
into a linear programming framework.
Lemma 4.2. Let N(p) be a feasible polynomial matrix of degree dN for the inequalities (9),
where
H(p) :=
dH∑
i=0
Hip
i, F (p) :=
dF∑
i=0
Fip
i, N(p) :=
dN∑
i=0
Nip
i,
and Hi ∈ Rnr×nx , Fi ∈ Rnr×nf , and Ni ∈ R1×nr are constant matrices. Then, the polynomial
matrix inequalities (9) are equivalent, up to a scalar, to
N¯H¯ = 0,(10a) ∥∥N¯ F¯∥∥∞ ≥ 1,(10b)
where ‖ · ‖∞ is the infinity vector norm, and
N¯ :=
[
N0 N1 · · · NdN
]
H¯ :=

H0 H1 · · · HdH 0 · · · 0
0 H0 H1 · · · HdH 0
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 H0 H1 · · · HdH
 ,
F¯ :=

F0 F1 · · · FdF 0 · · · 0
0 F0 F1 · · · FdF 0
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 F0 F1 · · · FdF
 .
Proof. It is easy to observe that
N(p)H(p) = N¯H¯[I pI · · · piI]ᵀ, i := dN + dH ,
N(p)F (p) = N¯ F¯ [I pI · · · pjI]ᵀ, j := dN + dF .
Moreover, in light of the linear structure of equations (9), one can simply scale the inequality
(9b) and arrive at the assertion of the lemma. 
Strictly speaking, the formulation in Lemma 4.2 is not a linear program, due to the non-convex
constraint (10b). It is, however, easy to show that the characterization (10) can be understood
as a number of linear programs, which grows linearly in the degree of the filter:
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Lemma 4.3. Consider the sets
Nj :=
{
N¯ ∈ Rnr(dN+1) ∣∣ N¯H¯ = 0, N¯ F¯ vj ≥ 1}, vj := ↓ jth[0, · · · , 1, · · · , 0]ᵀ,
and let N := ⋃mj=1Nj where m := nf (dF + dN + 1) is the number of columns of F¯ (the param-
eters H¯, F¯ , nf , dF , dN are as considered in Lemma 4.2). Then, the set characterized by (10) is
equivalent to N ∪−N .
Proof. Notice that ‖N¯ F¯‖∞ ≥ 1 if and only if there exists a coordinate j such that N¯ F¯ vj ≥ 1 or
N¯ F¯ vj ≤ −1. Thus, the proof readily follows from the fact that each of the set Nj focuses on a
component of the vector N¯ F¯ in (10b). 
Fact 4.4. There exists a solution N(p) to (9) if and only if Rank [H(p) F (p)] > Rank H(p).
Fact 4.4 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the feasibility of the linear program
formulation in Lemma 4.2; proof is omitted as it is an easy adaptation of the one in [FKA09,
Corollary 3].
4.2. Extension to Nonlinear Systems. In the presence of nonlinear terms E(x) 6= 0, it is
straightforward to observe that the residual of filter (8) consists of two terms:
r := R(p)z = − a−1(p)N(p)F (p)f︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
− a−1(p)N(p)E(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
.(11)
Term (i) is the desired contribution of the fault f and is in common with the linear setup. Term
(ii) is due to the nonlinear term E( · ) in (5). Our aim here will be to reduce the impact of
E(x) while increasing the sensitivity to the fault f . To achieve this objective, we develop two
approaches to control each of the two terms separately; in both cases we assume that the degree
of the filter (i.e., dN in Lemma 4.2) and the denominator (i.e., a(p) in (11)) are fixed, and the
aim is to design the numerator coefficients (i.e., N(p) in (11)).
Approach (I) (Fault Sensitivity). To focus on fault sensitivity while neglecting the contribution of
the nonlinear term, we assume that the system operates close to an equilibrium point xe ∈ Rnx .
Even though in case of a fault the system may eventually deviate substantially from its nominal
operating point, if the FDI filter succeeds in identifying the fault early the system will not have
time to deviate too far. Hence, one may hope that a filter based on linearizing the system
dynamics around the equilibrium would suffice. Then we assume, without loss of generality,
that
lim
x→xe
∥∥E(x)∥∥
2
‖x− xe‖2 = 0,
where ‖ · ‖2 stands for the Euclidean norm of a vector. If this is not the case, the linear part of
E( · ) can be extracted and included in the linear part of the system.
To increase the sensitivity of the linear filter to the fault f , we revisit the linear programming
formulation (10) and seek a feasible numerator N(p) such that the coefficients of the transfer
function N(p)F (p) attain maximum values within the admissible range. This gives rise to the
9
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following optimization problem: 
max
N¯
∥∥N¯ F¯∥∥∞
s.t. N¯H¯ = 0∥∥N¯∥∥∞ ≤ 1
(12)
where the objective function targets the contribution of the signal f to the residual r. Let us
recall that N¯ F¯ is the vector containing all numerator coefficients of the transfer function f 7→ r.
The second constraint in (12) is added to ensure that the solutions remain bounded; note that
thanks to the linearity of the filter this constraint does not influence the performance. Though
strictly speaking (12) is not a linear program, in a similar fashion as in Lemma 4.3 it is easy to
transform it to a family of m different linear programs, where m is the number of columns of F¯ .
How well the filter designed by (12) will work depends on the magnitude of the second term
in (11), which is due to the nonlinearities E(x) and is ignored in (12). If the term generated by
E(x) is large enough, the filter may lead to false alarms, whereas if we set our thresholds high to
tolerate the disturbance generated by E(x) in nominal conditions, the filter may lead to missed
detections. A direct way toward controlling this trade-off involving the nonlinear term will be
the focus of the second approach.
Approach (II) (Robustify to Nonlinearity Signatures). This approach is the main step toward
the theoretical contribution of the article, and provides the principle ingredients to tackle the
proposed perspectives AP and CP introduced in (3). The focus is on term (ii) of the residual
(11), in relation to the mapping (1a). The idea is to robustify the filter against certain signatures
of the nonlinearity during nominal operation. In the following we restrict the class of filters to
the feasible solutions of polynomial matrix equations (9), characterized in Lemma 4.2.
Let us denote the space of all p.w.c. functions from the interval [0, T ] to Rn byWnT . We equip
this space with the L2-inner product and the corresponding norm
‖e‖L2 :=
√
〈e, e〉, 〈e, g〉 :=
∫ T
0
eᵀ(t)g(t)dt, e, g ∈ WnT .
Consider an unknown signal x ∈ WnxT . In the context of the ODEs (6) that means we excite
the system with the disturbance d( · ) for the time horizon T . We then stack d( · ) together with
the internal state X( · ) to introduce x := [Xd ]. We define the signals ex ∈ WnrT and rx ∈ W1T as
follows:
ex(t) := E
(
x(t)
)
, rx(t) := −a−1(p)N(p)[ex](t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ].(13)
The signal ex is the “nonlinearity signature” in the presence of the unknown signal x, and the
signal rx is the contribution of the nonlinear term to the residual of the linear filter. Our goal
now is to minimize ‖rx‖L2 in an optimization framework in which the coefficients of polynomial
N(p) are the decision variables and the denominator a(p) is a fixed stable polynomial with the
degree at least the same as N(p).
Lemma 4.5. Let N(p) be a polynomial row vector of dimension nr and degree dN , and a(p)
be a stable scalar polynomial with the degree at least dN . For any x ∈ WnxT there exists ψx ∈
Wnr(dN+1)T such that
rx(t) = N¯ψx(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ](14a)
‖ψx‖L2 ≤ C‖ex‖L2 , C :=
√
nr(dN + 1)‖a−1‖H∞ ,(14b)
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where N¯ is the vector collecting all the coefficients of the numerator N(p) as introduced in Lemma
4.2, and the signals ex and rx are defined as in (13).
Proof. See Appendix I.1. 
Given x ∈ WnxT and the corresponding function ψx as defined in Lemma 4.5, we have
‖rx‖2L2 = N¯QxN¯ᵀ, Qx :=
∫ T
0
ψx(t)ψ
ᵀ
x(t)dt.(15)
We call Qx the “signature matrix” of the nonlinearity signature t 7→ ex(t) resulting from the
unknown signal x. Given x and the corresponding signature matrix Qx, the L2-norm of rx in
(13) can be minimized by considering an objective which is a quadratic function of the filter
coefficients N¯ subject to the linear constraints in (10):
min
N¯
N¯QxN¯
ᵀ
s.t. N¯H¯ = 0∥∥N¯ F¯∥∥∞ ≥ 1
(16)
The program (16) is not a true quadratic program due to the second constraint. Following
Lemma 4.3, however, one can show that the optimization program (16) can be viewed as a
family of m quadratic programs where m = nf (dF + dN + 1).
In the rest of the subsection, we establish an algorithmic approach to approximate the matrix
Qx for a given x ∈ WnxT , with an arbitrary high precision. We first introduce a finite dimensional
subspace of W1T denoted by
B := span{b0, b1, · · · , bk},(17)
where the collection of bi : [0, T ] → R is a basis for B. Let Bnr :=
⊗nr
i=1 B be the nr Cartesian
product of the set B, and TB :WnrT → Bnr be the L2-orthogonal projection operator onto Bnr ,
i.e.,
TB(ex) =
k∑
i=0
β?i bi, β
? := arg min
β
∥∥ex − k∑
i=0
βibi
∥∥
L2(18)
Let us remark that if the basis of B is orthonormal (i.e., 〈bi, bj〉 = 0 for i 6= j), then β?i =
T∫
0
bi(t)ex(t)dt; we refer to [Lue69, Section 3.6] for more details on the projection operator.
Assumption 4.6. We stipulate that
(i) The basis functions bi of subspace B are smooth and B is closed under the differentiation
operator p, i.e., for any b ∈ B we have p[b] = ddtb ∈ B.
(ii) The basis vectors in (17) are selected from an L2-complete basis for W1T , i.e., for any
e ∈ WnrT , the projection error
∥∥e − TB(e)∥∥L2 can be made arbitrarily small by increasing
the dimension k of subspace B.
The requirements of Assumptions 4.6 can be fulfilled for subspaces generated by, for example,
the polynomial or Fourier basis. Thanks to Assumption 4.6(i), the linear operator p can be
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viewed as a matrix operator. That is, there exists a square matrix D with dimension k+ 1 such
that
p[B(t)] =
d
dt
B(t) = DB(t), B(t) := [b0(t), · · · , bk(t)]ᵀ.(19)
In Section 5.2 we will provide an example of such matrix operator for the Fourier basis. By
virtue of the matrix representations of (19) we have
N(p)TB(ex) =
dN∑
i=0
Nip
iβ?B =
dN∑
i=0
Niβ
?DiB = N¯D¯B, D¯ :=

β?
β?D
...
β?DdN
 ,(20)
where the vector β? := [β?0 , · · · , β?k ] is introduced in (18). If we define the positive semidefinite
matrix G := [Gij ] of dimension k + 1 by
Gij :=
〈
a−1(p)[bi], a−1(p)[bj ]
〉
,(21)
we arrive at ∥∥a−1(p)N(p)TB(e)∥∥2L2 = N¯QBN¯ᵀ, QB := D¯GD¯ᵀ,(22)
where D¯ and G are defined in (20) and (21), respectively. Note that the matrices G and D are
built by the data of the subspace B and denominator a(p), whereas the nonlinearity signature
only influences the coefficient β?. The above discussion is summarized in Algorithm 1 with an
emphasis on models described by the ODE (6), while Proposition 4.7 addresses the precision of
the approximation scheme.
Proposition 4.7 (Signature Matrix Approximation). Consider an unknown signal x : [0, T ]→
Rnx in WnxT and the corresponding nonlinearity signature ex and signature matrix Qx as defined
in (13) and (15), respectively. Let (bi)i∈N ⊂ W1T be a family of basis functions satisfying As-
sumptions 4.6, and let B be the finite dimensional subspace in (17). If ‖ex − TB(ex)‖L2 < δ,
where TB is the projection operator onto Bnr , then∥∥Qx −QB∥∥2 < C¯δ, C¯ := (1 + 2‖ex‖L2)C‖a−1‖H∞ ,(23)
where QB is obtained by (22) (the output of Algorithm 1), and C is the same constant as in
(14b).
Proof. See Appendix I.1. 
Remark 4.8 (Multi Signatures Training). In order to robustify the FDI filter to more than
one unknown signal, say {xi( · )}ni=1, one may introduce an objective function as an average cost
N¯
(
1
n
∑n
i=1Qxi
)
N¯ᵀ or the worst case viewpoint maxi≤n N¯QxiN¯
ᵀ, where Qxi is the signature
matrix corresponding to xi as defined in (15).
4.3. Proposed Methodology and Probabilistic Performance. The preceding subsection
proposed two optimization-based approaches to enhance the FDI filter design from linear to
nonlinear system dynamics. Approach (I) targets the fault sensitivity while neglecting the non-
linear term of the system dynamics, and Approach (II) offers a QP framework to robustify the
residual with respect to signatures of the dynamic nonlinearities. Here our aim is to achieve a
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Algorithm 1 Computing the signature matrix Qx in (15)
(i) Initialization of the Filter Paramters:
(a) Select a stable filter denominator a(p), a numerator degree dN not higher than a(p)
order, and horizon T
(b) Select a basis {bi}ki=1 ⊂ W1T satisfying Assumptions 4.6
(c) Compute the differentiation matrix D in (19)
(d) Compute the matrix G in (21) 1
(ii) Identification of the Nonlinearity Signature:
(a) Input the disturbance pattern d( · ) for time horizon T
(b) Solve (6) under inputs d( · ) and f ≡ 0 to obtain the internal state X( · )
(c) Set the unknown signal x(t) := [Xᵀ(t), dᵀ(t)]ᵀ
(d) Set the nonlinearity signature ex(t) :=
[
EᵀX
(
x(t)
)
, EᵀY
(
x(t)
)]ᵀ
(iii) Computation of the Signature Matrix
(a) Compute β? from (18) (in case of orthonormal basis β?i =
T∫
0
bi(t)ex(t)dt)
(b) Compute D¯ from (20)
(c) Ouput QB := D¯GD¯ᵀ in (22)
reconciliation between these two approaches. We subsequently provide theoretical results from
the proposed solutions to the original design perspectives (3).
Let (di)
n
i=1 ⊂ D be i.i.d. disturbance patterns generated from the probability space (Ω,F ,P).
For each di, let xi be the corresponding unknown signal with the associated signature matrix Qxi
as defined in (15). In regard to the average perspective AP, we propose the two-stage (random)
optimization program
A˜P1 :

min
γ,N¯
γ
s.t. N¯H¯ = 0∥∥N¯ F¯∥∥∞ ≥ 1
1
n
n∑
i=1
J
(√
N¯QxiN¯
ᵀ
)
≤ γ
(24a)
A˜P2 :

max
N¯
∥∥N¯ F¯∥∥∞
s.t. N¯H¯ = 0∥∥N¯∥∥∞ ≤ 1
1
n
n∑
i=1
J
(
‖N¯?1 ‖∞
√
N¯QxiN¯
ᵀ
)
≤ γ?1
(24b)
where J : R+ → R+ is an increasing and convex payoff function, and in the second stage
(24b) N¯?1 and γ
?
1 are the optimizers of the first stage (24a), i.e., the programs (24) need to be
1A conservative but easy-to-implement approach is to set G an identity matrix with dimension k + 1.
13
A Tractable FDI Approach for Nonlinear Systems with Probabilistic Performance
solved sequentially in a lexicographic (multi-objective) sense [MA04]. Let us recall that the filter
coefficients can always be normalized with no performance deterioration. Hence, it is straight-
forward to observe that the main goal of the second stage is only to improve the coefficients
of N¯ F¯ (concerning the fault sensitivity) while the optimality of the first stage (concerning the
robustification to nonlinearity signatures) is guaranteed. Similarly, we also propose the following
two-stage program for the perspective CP:
C˜P1 :

min
γ,N¯
γ
s.t. N¯H¯ = 0∥∥N¯ F¯∥∥∞ ≥ 1
max
i≤n
N¯QxiN¯
ᵀ ≤ γ
(25a)
C˜P2 :

max
N¯
∥∥N¯ F¯∥∥∞
s.t. N¯H¯ = 0∥∥N¯∥∥∞ ≤ 1
‖N¯?1 ‖2∞
(
max
i≤n
N¯QxiN¯
ᵀ) ≤ γ?1
(25b)
Remark 4.9 (Computational Complexity). In view of Lemma 4.3, all the programs in (24)
and (25) can be written as families of convex programs, and hence are tractable. It is, however,
worth noting that in case the payoff function of A˜P is J(α) := α2, the computational complexity
of the resulting programs in (24) is independent of the number of scenarios n, since the problems
effectively reduce to a quadratic programming with a constraint involving the average of all the
respective signature matrices (i.e., 1n
∑n
i=1Qxi). This is particularly of interest if one requires
to train the filter for a large number of scenarios.
Clearly, the filter designed by programs (24) and (25) is robustified to only finitely many
most likely events, and as such, it may remain sensitive to disturbance patterns which have not
been observed in the training phase. However, thanks to the probabilistic guarantees detailed in
the sequel, we shall show that the probability of such failures (false alarm) is low. In fact, the
tractability of our proposed scheme comes at the price of allowing for rare threshold violation
of the filter. The rest of the subsection formalizes this probabilistic bridge between the program
(24) (resp. (25)) and the original perspective AP (resp. CP) in (3) when the class of filters is
confined to the linear residuals characterized in Lemma 4.2. For this purpose, we need a technical
measurability assumption which is always expected to hold in practice.
Assumption 4.10 (Measurability). We assume that the mapping D 3 d 7→ x ∈ WnxT is mea-
surable where the function spaces are endowed with the L2-topology and the respective Borel
sigma-algebra. In particular, x can be viewed as a random variable on the same probability space
as d.
Assumption 4.10 is referred to the behavior of the system dynamics as a mapping from the
disturbance d to the internal states. In the context of ODEs (6), it is well-known that under
mild assumptions (e.g., Lipschitz continuity of EX) the mapping d 7→ X is indeed continuous
[Kha92, Chapter 5], which readily ensures Assumption 4.10.
4.3.1. Probabilistic performance of A˜P. Here we study the asymptotic behavior of the empirical
average of E
[
J(‖r‖)] uniformly in the filter coefficients N¯ , which allows us to link the solutions
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of programs (24) to AP. Let N := {N¯ ∈ Rnr(dN+1) : ‖N¯‖∞ ≤ 1} and consider the payoff
function of AP in (3) as the mapping φ : N ×WnxT → R+:
φ(N¯ , x) := J
(‖rx‖L2) = J(‖N¯ψx‖L2),(26)
where the second equality follows from Lemma 4.5.
Theorem 4.11 (Average Performance). Suppose Assumption 4.10 holds and the random vari-
able x is almost surely bounded2. Then, the mapping N¯ 7→ φ(N¯ , x) is a random function.
Moreover, if (xi)
n
i=1 ⊂ WnxT are i.i.d. random variables and en is the uniform empirical average
error
en := sup
N¯∈N
{ 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ(N¯ , xi)− E
[
φ(N¯ , x)
]}
,(27)
then,
(i) the Strong Law of Large Numbers (SLLN) holds, i.e., lim
n→∞ en = 0 almost surely.
(ii) the Uniform Central Limit Theorem (UCLT) holds, i.e.,
√
nen converges in law to a
Gaussian variable with distribution N(0, σ) for some σ ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix I.2 along with required preliminaries. 
The following Corollary is an immediate consequence of the UCLT in Theorem 4.11 (ii).
Corollary 4.12. Let assumptions of Theorem 4.11 hold, and en be the empirical average error
(27). For all ε > 0 and k < 12 , we have
lim
n→∞P
n
(
nken ≥ ε
)
= 0,
where Pn denotes the n-fold product probability measure on
(
Ωn,Fn).
4.3.2. Probabilistic performance of C˜P. The formulation CP in (3) is known as chance con-
strained program which has received increasing attention due to recent developments toward
tractable approaches, in particular via the scenario counterpart (cf. C˜P in (4)) in a convex
setting [CC06, CG08]. These studies are, however, not directly applicable to our problem due
to the non-convexity arising from the constraint ‖N¯ F¯‖∞ ≥ 1. Here, following our recent work
[MSL15], we exploit the specific structure of this non-convexity and adapt the scenario approach
accordingly.
Let
(
N¯?n, γ
?
n
)
be the optimizer obtained through the two-stage programs (25) where N¯?n is the
filter coefficients and γ?n represents the filter threshold; n is referred to the number of disturbance
patterns. Given the filter N¯?n, let us denote the corresponding filter residual due to the signal x
by rx[N¯
∗
n]; this is a slight modification of our notation rx in (13) to specify the filter coefficients.
To quantify the filter performance, one may ask for the probability that a new unknown signal x
violates the threshold γ?n when the FDI filter is set to N¯
?
n (i.e., the probability that
∥∥rx[N¯∗n]∥∥2L2 >
γ∗n). In the FDI literature such a violation is known as a false alarm, and from the CP standpoint
its occurrence probability is allowed at most to the ε level. In this view the performance of the
filter can be quantified by the event
E(N¯?n, γ∗n) := {P(∥∥rx[N¯∗n]∥∥2L2 > γ∗n) > ε}.(28)
2This assumption may be relaxed in terms of the moments of x, though this will not be pursued further here.
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The event (28) accounts for the feasibility of the C˜P solution from the original perspective CP.
Note that the measure P in (28) is referred to x whereas the stochasticity of the event stems
from the random solutions
(
N¯?n, γ
∗
n
)
.3
Theorem 4.13 (Chance Performance). Suppose Assumption 4.10 holds and (xi)
n
i=1 are i.i.d.
random variables on (Ω,F ,P). Let N¯?n ∈ Rnr(dN+1) and γ∗n ∈ R+ be the solutions of C˜P, and
measurable in Fn. Then, the set (28) is Fn-measurable, and for every β ∈ (0, 1) and any n such
that
n ≥ 2
ε
(
ln
nf (dF + dN + 1)
β
+ nr(dN + 1) + 1
)
,
where dN is the degree of the filter and nf , nr, dF are the system size parameters of (5), we have
Pn
(
E(N¯?n, γ∗n)) < β.
Proof. See Appendix I.2. 
5. Cyber-Physical Security of Power Systems: AGC Case Study
In this section, we illustrate the performance of our theoretical results to detect a cyber
intrusion in a two-area power system. Motivated by our earlier studies [MVM+10, MVM+11],
we consider the IEEE 118-bus power network equipped with primary and secondary frequency
control. While the primary frequency control is implemented locally, the secondary loop, referred
also as AGC (Automatic Generation Control), is closed over the SCADA system without human
operator intervention. As investigated in [MVM+10], a cyber intrusion in this feedback loop may
cause unacceptable frequency deviations and potentially load shedding or generation tripping.
If the intrusion is, however, detected on time, one may prevent further damage by disconnecting
the AGC. We show how to deploy the methodology developed in earlier sections to construct an
FDI filter that uses the available measurements to diagnose an AGC intrusion sufficiently fast,
despite the presence of unknown load deviations.
5.1. Mathematical Model Description. In this section a multi-machine power system, based
only on frequency dynamics, is described [Andb]. The system is arbitrarily divided into two
control areas. The generators are equipped with primary frequency control and each area is under
AGC which adjusts the generating setpoints of specific generators so as to regulate frequency
and maintain the power exchange between the two areas to its scheduled value.
5.1.1. System description. We consider a system comprising n buses and g number of generators.
Let G = {i}g1 denote the set of generator indices and A1 = {i ∈ G | i in Area 1}, A2 = {i ∈
G | i in Area 2} the sets of generators that belong to Area 1 and Area 2, respectively. Let also
Lktie = {(i, j)|i, j edges of a tie line from area k to the other areas},
where a tie line is a line connecting the two independently controlled areas and let also K = {1, 2}
be the set of the indices of the control areas in the system.
Using the classical generator model every synchronous machine is modeled as constant voltage
source behind its transient reactance. The dynamic states of the system are the rotor angle δi
(rad), the rotor electrical frequency fi (Hz) and the mechanical power (output of the turbine)
3The measure P is, with slight abuse of notation, the induced measure via the mapping addressed in Assump-
tion 4.10.
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Pmi (MW ) for each generator i ∈ G. We also have one more state that represents the output of
the AGC ∆Pagck for each control area k ∈ K.
We denote by EG ∈ Cg a vector consisting of the generator internal node voltages EGi =
|E0Gi|∠δi for i ∈ G. The phase angle of the generator voltage node is assumed to coincide with
the rotor angle δi and |E0Gi| is a constant. The voltages of the rest of the nodes are included in
VN ∈ Cn, whose entries are VNi = |VNi|∠θi for i = 1, . . . , n. To remove the algebraic constraints
that appear due to the Kirchhoff’s first law for each node, we retain the internal nodes (behind
the transient reactance) of the generators and eliminate the rest of the nodes. This could be
achieved only under the assumption of constant impedance loads since in that way they can be
included in the network admittance matrix. The node voltages can then be linearly connected
to the internal node voltages, and hence to the dynamic state δi. This results in a reduced
admittance matrix that corresponds only to the internal nodes of the generators, where the
power flows are expressed directly in terms of the dynamic states of the system. The resulting
model of the two area power system is described by the following set of equations.
δ˙i = 2pi(fi − f0),
f˙i =
f0
2HiSBi
(Pmi − Pei(δ)−
1
Di
(fi − f0)−∆Ploadi),
P˙m,ak =
1
Tch,ak
(P 0m,ak + vak∆P
sat
p,ak
+ wak∆P
sat
agc,k − Pm,ak),
∆P˙agc,k =
∑
j∈Ak
ckj(fj − f0) +
∑
j∈Ak
bkj(Pmj − Pej (δ)−∆Ploadj )
− 1
TNk
gk(δ, f)− Cpkhk(δ, f)−
Kk
TNk
(∆Pagc,k −∆P satagc,k).
where i ∈ G, ak ∈ Ak for k ∈ K. Supperscript sat on the AGC output signal ∆Pagc,k and on
the primary frequency control signal ∆Pp,ak highlights the saturation to which the signals are
subjected. The primary frequency control is given by ∆Pp,i = −(fi − f0)/Si. Based on the
reduced admittance matrix, the generator electric power output is given by
Pei =
g∑
j=1
EGiEGj (G
red
ij cos(δi − δj) +Bredij sin(δi − δj)).
Moreover, gk :=
∑
(i,j)∈Lktie(Pij − PT 012) and hk :=
dgk
dt , where the power flow Pij , based on the
initial admittance matrix of the system, is given by
Pij = |VNi ||VNj |(Gij cos(θi − θj) +Bij sin(θi − θj))
All undefined variables are constants, and details on the derivation of the models can be found in
[MVAL12]. The AGC attack is modeled as an additive signal to the AGC signal. For instance, if
the attack signal is imposed in Area 1, the mechanical power dynamics of Area 1 will be modified
as
P˙m,a1 =
1
Tch,a1
(P 0m,a1 + va1∆P
sat
p,a1 + wa1
(
∆P satagc1 + f(t)
)− Pm,a1),
The above model can be compactly written as{
X˙(t) = h(X(t)) +Bdd(t) +Bff(t)
Y (t) = CX(t),
(29)
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Figure 2. Stochastic load fluctuation and prediction error [Anda, p. 59]
where X :=
[{δi}1:g, {fi}1:g, {Pm,i}1:g, {∆Pagci}1:2]ᵀ ∈ R3g+2 denotes the internal states vector
comprising rotor angles δi, generators frequencies fi, generated mechanical powers Pm,i, and the
AGC control signal ∆Pagci for each area. The external input d :=
[{∆Ploadi}1:g]ᵀ represents the
unknown load disturbances (discussed in the next subsection), and f represents the intrusion
signal injected to the AGC of the first area. We assume that the measurements of all the
frequencies and generated mechanical power are available, i.e., Y =
[{fi}1:g, {Pm,i}1:g]ᵀ ∈ R2g.
The nonlinear function h( · ) and the constant matrices Bd, Bf and C can be easily obtained by
the mapping between the analytical model and (29). To transfer the ODE dynamic expression
(29) into the DAE (5) it suffices to introduce
x :=
[
X −Xe
d
]
, z := Y − CXe
E(x) :=
[
h(X)−A(X −Xe)
0
]
, H(p) :=
[
−pI +A Bd
C 0
]
, L(p) :=
[
0
−I
]
, F (p) :=
[
Bf
0
]
,
where Xe is the equilibrium of (29), i.e., h(Xe) = 0, and A :=
∂h
∂X
∣∣
X=Xe
. Notice that by the
above definition, the nonlinear term E( · ) only carries the nonlinearity of the system while the
linear terms of the dynamic are incorporated into the constant matrices H,L, F . This can always
be done without loss of generality, and practically may improve the performance of the scheme,
as the linear terms can be fully decoupled from the residual of the filter.
5.1.2. Load Deviations and Disturbances. Small power imbalances arise during normal operation
of power networks due, for example, to load fluctuation, load forecast errors, and trading on
electricity market. Each of these sources give rise to deviations at different time scale. High
frequency load fluctuation is typically time uncorrelated stochastic noise on a second or minute
time scale, whereas forecast errors usually stem from the mismatch of predicted and actual
consumption on a 15-minute time scale. Figure 2 demonstrates two samples of stochastic load
fluctuation and forecast error which may appear at two different nodes of the network [Anda,
p. 59]. The trading on the electricity market also introduces disturbances, for example, in an
hourly framework (depending on the market).
To capture these sources of uncertainty we consider a space of disturbance patterns comprising
combinations of sinusoids at different frequency ranges (to model short term load fluctuation
and mid-term forecast errors) and step functions (to model long-term abrupt changes due to the
market). The space of load deviations (i.e., the disturbance patterns D in our FDI setting) is
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then described by
∆Pload(t) := α0 +
η∑
i=1
αi sin(ωit+ φi), t ∈ [0, T ],(30)
where the parameters (αi)
η
i=0, (ωi)
η
i=1 (φi)
η
i=1, and η are random variables whose distributions
induce the probability measure on D. We assume that ∑ηi=0 |αi|2 is uniformly bounded with
probability 1 to meet the requirements of Theorem 4.11.
5.2. Diagnosis Filter Design. To design the FDI filter, we set the degree of the filter dN = 7,
the denominator a(p) = (p+ 2)dN , and the finite time horizon T = 10 sec. Note that the degree
of the filter is significantly less than the dimension of the system (29), which is 59. This is
a general advantage of the residual generator approach in comparison to the observer-based
approach where the filter order is effectively the same as the system dynamics. To compute the
signature matrix Qx, we resort to the finite dimensional approximation QB in Proposition 4.7.
Inspired by the class of disturbances in (30), we first choose Fourier basis with 80 harmonics
bi(t) :=
{
cos( i2ωt) i : even
sin( i+12 ωt) i : odd
, ω :=
2pi
T
, i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 80}.(31)
We should emphasize that there is no restriction on the basis selection as long as Assumptions
4.6 are fulfilled; we refer to [MVAL12, Section V.B] for another example with a polynomial basis.
Given the basis (31), it is easy to see that the differentiation matrix D introduced in (19) is
D =

0 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 ω · · · 0 0
0 −ω 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 0 80ω
0 0 0 · · · −80ω 0

.
We can also compute offline (independent of x) the matrix G in (21) with the help of the basis
(31) and the denominator a(p). To proceed withQx of a sample ∆Pload we need to run the system
dynamic (29) with the input d( · ) := ∆Pload and compute x(t) := [X(t)ᵀ,∆Pload(t)]ᵀ where X is
the internal states of the system. Given the signal x, we then project the nonlinearity signature
t 7→ ex(t) =: E
(
x(t)
)
onto the subspace B (i.e., TB(ex)), and finally obtain Qx from (22). In
the following simulations, we deploy the YALMIP toolbox [Lof04] to solve the corresponding
optimization problems.
5.3. Simulation Results.
5.3.1. Test system. To illustrate the FDI methodology we employed the IEEE 118-bus system.
The data of the model are retrieved from a snapshot available at [ref]. It includes 19 generators,
177 lines, 99 load buses and 7 transmission level transformers. Since there were no dynamic
data available, typical values provided by [AF02] were used for the simulations. The network
was arbitrarily divided into two control areas whose nonlinear frequency model was developed
in the preceding subsections. Figure 3 depicts a single-line diagram of the network and the
boundaries of the two controlled areas where the first and second area contain, respectively, 12
and 7 generators.
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Area 1
Area 2
Figure 3. IEEE 118-bus system divided into two control areas
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Figure 4. Performance of the FDI filters with step inputs
5.3.2. Numerical results. In the first simulation we consider the scenario that an attacker ma-
nipulates the AGC signal of the first area at Tack = 10 sec. We model this intrusion as a step
signal equal to 14 MW injected into the AGC in Area 1. To challenge the filter, we also assume
that a step load deviation occurs at Tload = 1 sec at node 5. In the following we present the
results of two filters: Figure 4(a) shows the filter based on formulation (12) in Approach (I),
which basically neglects the nonlinear term; Figure 4(b) shows the proposed filter in (24) based
on AP perspective where the payoff function is J(α) := α2; see Remark 4.9 why such a payoff
function is of particular interest.
We validate the filters performance with two sets of measurements: first the measurements
obtained from the linearized dynamic (i.e. E(x) ≡ 0); second the measurements obtained from
the full nonlinear model (29). As shown in Fig. 4(a)(ii) and Fig. 4(b)(ii), both filters work
perfectly well with linear dynamics measurements. It even appears that the first filter seems
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Figure 5. The indicator ρ defined in (32)
more sensitive. However, Fig. 4(a)(iii) and Fig. 4(b)(iii) demonstrate that in the nonlinear setting
the first filter fails whereas the robustified filter works effectively similar to the linear setting.
In the second simulation, to evaluate the filter performance in more realistic setup, we robus-
tify the filter to random disturbance patterns, and then verify it with new generated samples.
To measure the performance in the presence of the attack, we introduce the following indicator:
ρ :=
max
t≤Tack
‖r(t)‖∞
max
t≤T
‖r(t)‖∞ ,(32)
where r is the residual (11), and Tack is when the attack starts. Observe that ρ ∈ [0, 1], and the
lower ρ the better performance for the filter, e.g., in Fig. 4(a)(iii) ρ = 1, and in Fig. 4(b)(iii)
ρ ≈ 0.
In the training phase, we randomly generate five sinusoidal load deviations as described in
(30), and excite the dynamics for T = 10 sec in the presence of each of the load deviations
individually. Hence, in total we have n = 19×5 = 95 disturbance signatures. Then, we compute
the filter coefficients by virtue of A˜P in (24) with the payoff function J(α) := α2 and these
95 samples. In the operation phase, we generate two new disturbance patterns with the same
distribution as in the training phase and run the system in the presence of both load deviations
simultaneously at two random nodes for the horizon T = 120 sec. Meanwhile, we inject an attack
signal at Tack = 110 sec in the AGC, and compute the indicator ρ in (32). Figure 5 demonstrates
the result of this simulation for 1000 experiments.
6. Conclusion and Future Directions
In this article, we proposed a novel perspective toward the FDI filter design, which is tack-
led via an optimization-based methodology along with probabilistic performance guarantees.
Thanks to the convex formulation, the methodology is applicable to high dimensional nonlinear
systems in which some statistical information of exogenous disturbances are available. Moti-
vated by our earlier works, we deployed the proposed technique to design a diagnosis filter to
detect the AGC malfunction in two-area power network. The simulation results validated the
filter performance, particularly when the disturbance patterns are different from training to the
operation phase.
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The central focus of the work here is to robustify the filter to certain signatures of dynamic
nonlinearities in the presence of given disturbance patterns. As a next step, motivated by ap-
plications that the disruptive attack may follow certain patterns, a natural question is whether
the filter can be trained to these attack patterns. From the technical standpoint, this problem
in principle may be different from the robustification process since the former may involve max-
imization of the residual norm as opposed to the minimization for the robustification discussed
in this article. Therefore, this problem offers a challenge to reconcile the disturbance rejection
and the fault sensitivity objectives.
The proposed methodology in this study is applicable to both discrete and continuous-time
dynamics and measurements. In reality, however, we often have different time-setting in dif-
ferent parts, i.e., we only have discrete-time measurements while the system dynamics follows
a continuous-time behavior. We believe this setup introduces new challenges to the field. We
recently reported heuristic attempts toward this objective in [ETML13], though there is still a
need to address this problem in a rigorous and systematic framework.
Acknowledgment
The authors are grateful to M. Vrakopoulou and G. Andersson for the help on the AGC
case study. The first author also thanks G. Schildbach for fruitful discussions on randomized
algorithms.
I. Appendix
I.1. Proofs of Section 4.2. Let us start with a preliminary required for the main proof of this
section.
Lemma I.1. Let N(p) :=
∑dN
i=0Nip
i be an Rnr row polynomial vector with degree dN , and a(p)
be a stable polynomial with the degree at least dN . Let N¯ := [N0 N1 · · · NdN ] be the collection
of the coefficients of N(p). Then,∥∥a−1N∥∥H∞ ≤ C˜‖N¯‖∞, C˜ := √nr(dN + 1) ‖a−1‖H∞ .
Proof. Let b(p) :=
∑dN
i=0 bip
i be a polynomial scaler function. By H∞-norm definition we have∥∥a−1b∥∥2H∞ = sup
ω∈(−∞,∞)
∣∣∣ b(jω)
a(jω)
∣∣∣2 ≤ sup
ω∈[0,∞)
∑dN
i=0 |bi|2ω2i
|a(jω)|2 .(I.1)
Let b¯ :=
[
b0 b1 · · · bdN
]
. It is then straightforward to inspect that
dN∑
i=0
|bi|2ω2i ≤
{
(dN + 1)‖b¯‖2∞ if ω ∈ [0, 1]
(dN + 1)‖b¯‖2∞ω2dN if ω ∈ (1,∞)
(I.2)
Therefore, (I.1) together with (I.2) yields to∥∥a−1b∥∥2H∞ ≤ (dN + 1)∥∥a−1∥∥2H∞‖b¯‖2∞.
Now, taking the dimension of the vector N(p) into consideration, we conclude the desired asser-
tion. 
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Proof of Lemma 4.5. Let ` ≥ dN be the degree of the scalar polynomial a(p). Then, taking
advantage of the state-space representation of the matrix transfer function a−1(p)N(p), in par-
ticular the observable canonical form [ZD97, Section 3.5], we have
rx(t) =
∫ t
0
C e−A(t−τ)Bex(τ)dτ +Dex(t),
where C ∈ R1×` is a constant vector, A ∈ R`×` is the state matrix depending only on a(p),
and B ∈ R`×nr and D ∈ R1×nr are matrices that depend linearly on all the coefficients of
the numerator N¯ ∈ Rnr(dN+1). Therefore, it can be readily deduced that (14a) holds for some
function ψx ∈ Wnr(dN+1)T . In regard to (14a) and the definition (13), we have
‖N¯ψx‖L2 = ‖rx‖L2 =
∥∥a−1(p)N(p)ex∥∥L2 ≤ ∥∥a−1N∥∥H∞‖ex‖L2 ≤ C˜‖N¯‖∞‖ex‖L2 ,(I.3)
where the first inequality follows from the classical result that the L2-gain of a matrix transfer
function is the H∞-norm of the matrix [ZD97, Theorem 4.3, p. 51], and the second inequality
follows from Lemma I.1. Since (I.3) holds for every N¯ ∈ Rnr(dN+1), then
‖ψx‖L2 ≤
√
nr(dN + 1) C˜‖ex‖L2 ,
which implies (14b). 
Proof of Proposition 4.7. Observe that by virtue of the triangle inequality and linearity of the
projection mapping we have∣∣‖rx‖L2 − ∥∥a−1(p)N(p)TB(ex)∥∥L2∣∣ ≤ ∥∥a−1(p)N(p)(ex −TB(ex))∥∥L2 ≤ C˜‖N¯‖∞δ,
where the second inequality follows in the same spirit as (I.3) and ‖ex − TB(ex)‖L2 ≤ δ. Note
that by definitions of Qx and QB in (15) and (22), respectively, we have∣∣N¯(Qx −QB)N¯ᵀ∣∣ = ∣∣‖rx‖2L2 − ∥∥a−1(p)N(p)TB(ex)∥∥2L2∣∣ ≤ C˜‖N¯‖∞δ(C˜‖N¯‖∞δ + 2‖rx‖L2)
≤ C˜2‖N¯‖2∞δ
(
δ + 2‖ex‖L2
) ≤ C‖a−1‖H∞‖N¯‖22δ(1 + 2‖ex‖L2)
where the inequality of the first line stems from the simple inequality |α2 − β2| ≤ |α − β|(2|α| +
|α− β|), and C is the constant as in (14b). 
I.2. Proofs of Section 4.3. To prove Theorem 4.11 we need a preparatory result addressing
the continuity of the mapping φ in (26).
Lemma I.2. Consider the function φ as defined in (26). Then, there exists a constant L > 0
such that for any N¯1, N¯2 ∈ N and x1, x2 ∈ WnxT where ‖xi‖L2 ≤M , we have∣∣φ(N¯1, x1)− φ(N¯2, x2)∣∣ ≤ L(∥∥N¯1 − N¯2∥∥∞ + ‖x1 − x2‖L2).
Proof. Let LE be the Lipschitz continuity constant of the mapping E : Rnx → Rnr in (13). We
modify the notation of rx in (13) with a new argument as rx[N¯ ], in which N¯ represents the filter
coefficients. Then, with the aid of (I.3), we have
sup
‖x‖L2≤M
sup
N¯∈N
‖rx[N¯ ]‖L2 ≤ sup
‖x‖L2≤M
sup
N¯∈N
C˜LE‖N¯‖∞‖x‖L2 ≤ M˜, M˜ := C˜LEM,
where the constant C˜ is introduced in Lemma I.1. As the payoff function J is convex, it is then
Lipschitz continuous over the compact set [0, M˜ ] [Ber09, Proposition 5.4.2, p. 185]; we denote
this Lipschitz constant by LJ . Then for any N¯i ∈ N and ‖xi‖L2 ≤M , i ∈ {1, 2}, we have,∣∣φ(N¯1, x1)− φ(N¯2, x2)∣∣ ≤ LJ ∣∣∥∥rx1 [N1]∥∥L2 − ∥∥rx2 [N2]∥∥L2∣∣
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≤ LJ
(∥∥rx1 [N1]− rx1 [N2]∥∥L2 + ∥∥rx1 [N2]− rx2 [N2]∥∥L2)
≤ LJ
(
C˜‖ex1‖L2‖N1 −N2‖∞ + C˜‖ex1 − ex2‖L2‖N2‖∞
)
(I.4)
≤ LJ C˜LE
(
M‖N1 −N2‖∞ + ‖x1 − x2‖L2
)
.
where (I.4) follows from (I.3) and the fact that the mapping (N¯ , ex) 7→ rx[N¯ ] is bilinear. 
Proof of Theorem 4.11. By virtue of Lemma I.2, one can infer that for every N¯ ∈ N the mapping
x 7→ φ(N¯ , x) is continuous, and hence measurable. Therefore, φ(N¯ , x) can be viewed as a random
variable for each N¯ ∈ N , which yields to the first assertion, see [Bil99, Chapter 2, p. 84] for
more details.
By uniform (almost sure) boundedness and again Lemma I.2, the mapping N¯ 7→ φ(N¯ , x)
is uniformly Lipschitz continuous (except on a negligible set), and consequently first moment
continuous in the sense of [Han12, Definition 2.5]. We then reach (i) by invoking [Han12,
Theorem 2.1].
For assertion (ii), note that the compact set N is finite dimensional, and thus admits a
logarithmic ε-capacity in the sense of [Dud99, Section. 1.2, p. 11]. Therefore, the condition
[Dud99, (6.3.4), p. 209] is satisfied. Since the other requirements of [Dud99, Theorem 6.3.3, p.
208] are readily fulfilled by the uniform boundedness assumption and Lemma I.2, we arrive at
the desired UCLT assertion in (ii). 
To keep the paper self-contained, we provide a proof for Theorem 4.13 in the following, but
refer the interested reader to [MSL15, Theorem 4.1] for a result of a more general setting.
Proof of Theorem 4.13. The measurability of E is a straightforward consequence of the mea-
surability of [N¯?n, γ
?
n] and Fubini’s Theorem [Bil95, Theorem 18.3, p. 234]. For notational sim-
plicity, we introduce the following notation. Let ` := nr(dN + 1) + 1 and define the function
f : R` ×WnxT → R
f(θ, x) := N¯QxN¯
ᵀ − γ, θ := [N¯ , γ]ᵀ ∈ R`,
where Qx is the nonlinearity signature matrix of x as defined in (15), and θ is the augmented
vector collecting all the decision variables. Consider the convex sets Θj ⊂ R`
Θj :=
{
θ = [N¯ , γ]ᵀ
∣∣ N¯H¯ = 0, N¯ F¯ vj ≥ 1}, vj := ↓ jth[0, · · · , 1, · · · , 0]ᵀ,
where the size of vj is m := nf (dF +dN +1). Note that in view of Lemma 4.3, we can replace the
characterization of the filter coefficients in (10) with θ ∈ ⋃mj=1 Θj . We then express the program
CP in (3) and its random counterpart C˜P1 in (25a) as follows:
CP :

min
θ∈
m⋃
j=1
Θj
cᵀθ
s.t. P
(
f(θ, x) ≤ 0) ≥ 1− ε C˜P1 :

min
θ∈
m⋃
j=1
Θj
cᵀθ
s.t. max
i≤n
f(θ, xi) ≤ 0,
where c is the constant vector with 0 elements except the last which is 1. It is straightforward
to observe that the optimal threshold γ?n of the two-stage program C˜P in (25) is the same as the
optimal threshold obtained in the first stage C˜P1. Thus, it suffices to show the desired assertion
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considering only the first stage. Let θ?n := [N¯
?
n, γ
?
n] denote the optimizer of C˜P1. Now, consider
m sub-programs denoted by CP (j) and C˜P (j) for j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}:
CP (j) :
{
min
θ∈Θj
cᵀθ
s.t. P
(
f(θ, x) ≤ 0) ≥ 1− ε C˜P (j) :
 minθ∈Θj c
ᵀθ
s.t. max
i≤n
f(θ, xi) ≤ 0,
Let us denote the optimal solution of C˜P (j) by θ∗n,j . Note that for all j, the set Θj is deterministic
(not affected by x) and convex, and the corresponding random program C˜P (j) is feasible if
Θj 6= ∅, thanks to the min-max structure of C˜P (j). Therefore, we can readily employ the
existing results of the random convex problems. Namely, by [CG08, Theorem 1] we have
Pn
(E(θ∗n,j)) < `−1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
εi(1− ε)n−i, ∀j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}
where E is introduced in (28). Furthermore, it is not hard to inspect that θ∗n ∈
(
θ∗n,j
)m
j=1
. Thus,
E(θ∗n) ⊆
⋃m
j=1 E(θ∗n,j) which yields
Pn
(E(θ∗n)) ≤ Pn( m⋃
j=1
E(θ∗n,j)
)
≤
m∑
j=1
Pn
(E(θ∗n,j)) < m `−1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
εi(1− ε)n−i.
Now, considering β as an upper bound, the desired assertion can be obtained by similar calcu-
lation as in [Cal09] to make the above inequality explicit for n in terms of ε and β. 
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